{"id":"MAL-2026-13233","revision":"c3a9235e85dd4784a865e6cabcd76305","records":[{"revision":"c3a9235e85dd4784a865e6cabcd76305","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13233","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in bigops-procedure-file-handlers (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (0c15f49a67f4aa7071f4143a57c729f98dae58b01eb58ac77aabc666f1a1dda0)\nOn require of the package, _runtime.js downloads a platform-specific executable from obfuscated Cloudflare Workers endpoints (hostnames reassembled at runtime via array-join, e.g. oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev and sibling cf101/cf103/cf100 workers), writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a cover-story filename (dotnet_diag_<tag>.exe on Windows,.cache_<tag> on Unix), chmods it to 0755, and detached-spawns it via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe /c start /b. If HTTPS delivery fails, a fallback path queries DNS TXT records at subdomains of *.dl.wel1.ru, reads a chunk count from c.<host>, reassembles base64 chunks from N.<host> TXT records, and executes the resulting buffer. A stamp file.analytics_state is written to disguise the drop as OS/telemetry state. The obfuscation of destinations, covert DNS-TXT delivery channel, and disguised filenames indicate intentional evasion rather than legitimate telemetry or binary distribution.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:36:25+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T16:50:04.9037248+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"bigops-procedure-file-handlers","ranges":[],"versions":["35.7.6"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/bigops-procedure-file-handlers/v/35.7.6"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13233","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13233","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13233"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}