{"id":"MAL-2026-13341","revision":"19780592d05c4236a1d16d862028b02b","records":[{"revision":"19780592d05c4236a1d16d862028b02b","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13341","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (405339008cf0f3e8c17a5e982b006c85c7f9f8110bbdc6531b4c6f71c2fbabb0)\nOn require of the package, _shim.js assembles remote hostnames at runtime by joining split string fragments (four Cloudflare Workers subdomains such as oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev / cf103-070 / cf102-baf / cf99-9b3, with a DNS-TXT fallback to sdk.dl.wel1.ru / ext.dl.wel1.ru / pkg.dl.wel1.ru / net.dl.wel1.ru), downloads an opaque binary via https.get, writes it to /tmp or %TEMP% under a disguised name (.cache_<hex> or dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe), chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd.exe with unref(). Execution is gated behind a lock file and DO_NOT_TRACK/ANALYTICS_OPT_OUT environment variables framed as telemetry opt-outs. The runtime-reconstructed destinations, disguised filenames, and detached background execution demonstrate deliberate concealment. Nothing in the package's stated 'device integration / BNPL header' purpose justifies fetching and executing an opaque binary from anonymous Cloudflare Workers hosts on module load.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:21:27+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T16:51:01.2810967+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header","ranges":[],"versions":["35.3.6"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-boxy-mobile-bnpl-header/v/35.3.6"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13341","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13341","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13341"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}