{"id":"MAL-2026-13351","revision":"3c4b5d31caa64fc5ac0731133017318d","records":[{"revision":"3c4b5d31caa64fc5ac0731133017318d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13351","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in spl-token-utils (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (f95b625c92e85b1c0d5c10a192c70f8f82cf8d3b2ac7b66c034635b680785654)\nOn require, index.js serializes the full process.env together with hostname, username, homedir, platform, cwd, and package metadata, base64-encodes the payload, and sends it via an HTTPS GET to api.telegram.org/bot<redacted>/sendMessage with a hardcoded chat_id (8969499041). A marker file in the OS tmpdir suppresses repeat sends. The package presents itself as a drop-in replacement for @solana/spl-token and attempts to require and re-export the real @solana/spl-token so consumers see functional behavior while the exfiltration has already fired. Bulk process.env harvest at import time captures whatever credentials the installer's Node process has in environment — cloud keys, CI/publish tokens, database URLs — none of which relate to any legitimate SPL/Solana utility function. The typosquat name (spl-token-utils vs @solana/spl-token) makes accidental installs likely.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-05T15:39:00+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-05T16:51:08.7808273+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"spl-token-utils","ranges":[],"versions":["1.4.2"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/spl-token-utils/v/1.4.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13351","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13351","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13351"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}