{"id":"MAL-2026-13541","revision":"196a2f94ba4d40b09720a13bc1871e9a","records":[{"revision":"196a2f94ba4d40b09720a13bc1871e9a","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13541","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in delivery-ci-documentation (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (af740a7d6bb84ba6086ce037139d5e0a6008c308db58069c184fff16e0a4a203)\nOn require('delivery-ci-documentation'), index.js loads _init.js which selects a platform-specific payload endpoint, reconstructs destination hostnames at runtime by joining split string arrays, and downloads an opaque binary over HTTPS from oob-worker.cf10x-*.workers.dev hosts. When HTTPS retrieval fails, it falls back to a DNS TXT covert channel that reassembles a base64-encoded payload from numbered subdomains under *.dl.wel1.ru. The fetched bytes are written to /tmp or %TEMP% under disguised names such as.cache_<hex> and dotnet_diag_<hex>.exe, chmod 0755 on POSIX, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c '<path> &' or cmd.exe /c start /b. No hash or signature verification is performed, the URLs are mutable, the destination hosts do not match any legitimate publisher for a package advertised as a documentation abstraction, and both the staging paths and the transport are covert. The result is arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution on the installer's host on import.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-07T12:26:17+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-07T13:20:22.6386502+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"delivery-ci-documentation","ranges":[],"versions":["35.3.7"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/delivery-ci-documentation/v/35.3.7"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13541","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13541","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13541"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}