{"id":"MAL-2026-13563","revision":"368820cf4a3c45e3a509346cfc65d405","records":[{"revision":"368820cf4a3c45e3a509346cfc65d405","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13563","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in dolyame-ui-controlgroup (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (099af2a758510302726d266aeefb46cb91473a6a42c9484e068f465ea1509e84)\nOn require() of dolyame-ui-controlgroup, _compat.js selects a per-OS/arch URL and downloads a native binary from string-split-obfuscated hostnames (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev) with a DNS-over-TXT fallback under sdk.dl.wel1.ru, writes it to a temp file with a hidden/randomized name (dotnet-diag-lookalike), chmods 0755, and spawns it detached via `/bin/sh -c` or `cmd.exe /c start /b`. The declared main lib/telemetry.js duplicates the dropper via a base64-decoded buffer written to disk, chmod 755, and `/bin/sh -c` spawn, so the payload fires from the main module even if the _compat require is removed. Hostnames and dangerous API identifiers (`child_process`, `chmodSync`) are assembled at runtime via `.join(\"\")` and dynamic property access to evade string search. The download hosts, endpoints, and destination filenames are unrelated to the package's advertised monitoring/observability purpose.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-07T12:31:35+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-07T13:20:34.0900864+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"dolyame-ui-controlgroup","ranges":[],"versions":["35.8.1"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-ui-controlgroup/v/35.8.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13563","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13563","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13563"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}