{"id":"MAL-2026-13574","revision":"590b00f21b894cb296bc41fbdd5c47ba","records":[{"revision":"590b00f21b894cb296bc41fbdd5c47ba","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13574","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (7399edc4ed4854b8b8e61ebbebf6f31b658aaf0b4d798f789dde446c88004abb)\nOn require/import, _bootstrap.js selects a platform-specific path (/pkg/package, /pkg/package.exe, /pkg/loader_mac, /pkg/package-arm64) and downloads an opaque native binary over HTTPS from author-controlled hosts whose names are reconstructed at runtime from string-split arrays: oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf100-416.workers.dev, and oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev. A fallback path reassembles a base64 payload from enumerated DNS TXT records under sdk.dl.wel1.ru (c./0./1./... subdomain enumeration). The fetched bytes are written to /tmp/.cache_<rnd> on Unix or %TEMP%/dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe on Windows, chmod 0755, and spawned detached via /bin/sh -c or cmd. Any process that require()s the package immediately executes attacker-controlled native code with the installer's privileges; the string-splitting, filename masquerading as diagnostic caches, and DNS-TXT reassembly channel are active anti-analysis techniques rather than legitimate SDK behavior.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-07T12:36:23+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-07T13:20:40.2377336+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete","ranges":[],"versions":["35.8.1"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/dolyame-ui-inputautocomplete/v/35.8.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13574","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13574","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13574"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}