{"id":"MAL-2026-13605","revision":"b63e1e7f962c4dee86e1aa6e84087b14","records":[{"revision":"b63e1e7f962c4dee86e1aa6e84087b14","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13605","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in yakuza0 (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c9952a92dd18e2353ebb4f2d8064884e7be770d23770096af6dbe1844d8b5fd6)\nThe package ships code that binds outbound network calls to a hardcoded non-standard host, https://registry-pxnpm.rdc.nfjbill.ren, from cli/index.js (fetch calls at lines 513, 554, 623 alongside a reference to process.versions for host fingerprinting). Additional files server/proxy/tire.js and server/proxy/csrf.js combine child_process usage with curl-based POST/GET operations, mixing shell command execution with outbound HTTP to non-registry endpoints. The destination host is not the npm registry or a documented publisher domain; its name mimics the format of a private npm registry, and it is invoked from top-level module code paths rather than a user-invoked API. The composition — hardcoded attacker-shaped endpoint, runtime process/version fingerprinting, curl-driven POSTs, and child_process shell execution wired to the same network paths — matches the shape of installer-targeted exfiltration and remote command execution.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-07T12:49:02+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-07T13:21:02.1340029+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"yakuza0","ranges":[],"versions":["2.23.40","2.23.40-beta.3"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/yakuza0/v/2.23.40","https://www.npmjs.com/package/yakuza0/v/2.23.40-beta.3"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13605","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13605","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13605"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}