{"id":"MAL-2026-13737","revision":"7b0cea4f3d0f48ada50e1b8d1cece5c5","records":[{"revision":"7b0cea4f3d0f48ada50e1b8d1cece5c5","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13737","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @openzeppelin-4/contracts (npm)","description":"@openzeppelin-4/contracts is a malicious npm package published by npm account `mssjeep843` that impersonates OpenZeppelin's `@openzeppelin/contracts` (the v4 line) via the look-alike scope `@openzeppelin-4`, falsely describing itself as a \"compatibility distribution\". It ships no Solidity contracts — only an install-time payload (index.js) run via preinstall/postinstall that harvests credential-shaped environment variables and reads and exfiltrates SSH private keys, cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Kubernetes/Docker), Solana/Anchor/NEAR/Sui wallet keys, Foundry keystores, `.git-credentials` and local `.env` files to `https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09`. It is one of a series of DeFi/crypto impersonation packages from the same account sharing this webhook.site endpoint, which also squat Aerodrome Finance, Camelot AMM, Euler EVC, BoringVault and Uniswap Permit2.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (2841eb854dad391b8cf3d290704a888d5ac186a1f51aec84594eaa09acdfeb68)\nPackage name @openzeppelin-4/contracts impersonates the @openzeppelin/contracts scope but ships no Solidity contracts — only index.js, executed via lifecycle scripts. index.js enumerates process.env for credential-shaped keys (KEY, TOKEN, SECRET, AWS, GITHUB, NPM, MNEMONIC, WALLET, INFURA, etc.), reads installer secret files including ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.netrc, ~/.npmrc, ~/.gitconfig, ~/.git-credentials, gcloud application default credentials, Solana/Anchor/Sui keys, Foundry keystores, and project.env files, then POSTs the collected data to https://webhook.site/326b0891-2093-4800-a4c1-686ce3e07b09. Delivery uses spawn(process.execPath, ['-e', src], { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' }) with a randomized 60–240 second delay, and the script bails out when the hostname or username matches sandbox/scanner patterns (scan-, detonation, sandbox, ubuntu-fc-uvm) or when canary env markers are present, evading install-time analysis.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-11T15:16:48+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-12T09:45:11.7085847+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@openzeppelin-4/contracts","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.1","1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openzeppelin-4/contracts/v/1.0.1","https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openzeppelin-4/contracts/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13737","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13737","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13737"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}