{"id":"MAL-2026-13873","revision":"59e8b811c4a64871a48ee412a1370c5a","records":[{"revision":"59e8b811c4a64871a48ee412a1370c5a","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13873","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @years17/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (cae13b1ae51e25930b719e8953b7349777e5b6c98c514490a937eab4136de603)\nOn `npm install`, the package's postinstall hook runs `node callback.js` (with identical logic duplicated in `index.js` so it also fires on require). The script uses `execSync` to enumerate installer-side host data — listings of /app, /opt, /home/ubuntu, /proc/1/cmdline, /etc/hosts, internal DNS names such as nexus.local/proxy.nexus.local, and the contents of /home/ubuntu/.ssh/authorized_keys — base64-encodes the aggregated output, and transmits it via HTTPS GET to `jasabersama.id/portfolio-data.php` with `rejectUnauthorized: false` (TLS verification disabled). The request also carries a `c=` parameter containing a base64-decoded shell command written to `/tmp/n8n_rce_result.txt`, consistent with an attacker-side command-delivery handler. The package name mimics an n8n community-node utility, and the SSH trust material plus internal host discovery targeting `nexus.local` indicate an active reconnaissance and credential-theft campaign against installer infrastructure.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-12T12:38:15+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-12T13:00:14.4103855+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@years17/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@years17/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-d/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13873","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13873","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13873"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}