{"id":"MAL-2026-13917","revision":"ba14dc0f2c1f4a77942203211dff42ea","records":[{"revision":"ba14dc0f2c1f4a77942203211dff42ea","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13917","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @years20/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-h (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (96661ee04dc82c36bfa5683fc33f6d7a29d10d1e1bc21ece83ea4189dcf33ef3)\nPackage presents itself as an n8n community utility node but ships only a 213-byte no-op node file (nodes/PwnNode.node.js, self-labeled 'Pwn'). The real behavior is in callback.js (invoked via scripts.postinstall and byte-identical to the package's main index.js): it shells out to gather host reconnaissance (id, hostname, git and node versions, n8n install paths, contents of ~/.n8n), base64-encodes the output, and transmits it over HTTPS GET to a hardcoded endpoint at https://jasabersama.id/portfolio-data.php with a fixed key parameter and TLS certificate verification disabled (rejectUnauthorized:false). The URL's `c=` parameter smuggles a shell pipeline (`echo <base64> | base64 -d >> /tmp/n8n_rce_result.txt`) indicative of C2-style tasking. The exfil fires automatically on `npm install` and again on any `require()` of the package.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-12T15:39:56+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-12T16:03:34.3189476+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@years20/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-h","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@years20/n8n-nodes-utils-helper-h/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13917","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13917","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13917"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}