{"id":"MAL-2026-13923","revision":"4c101c05ff0941f0b64cb173716c77de","records":[{"revision":"4c101c05ff0941f0b64cb173716c77de","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13923","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in tailwind-form-templates (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (8febe917c3076e12756acd284d92cd2810cb59f7c546a6e669ef23caa56457bc)\nThe package name resembles @tailwindcss/forms and its src/index.js copies the legitimate @tailwindcss/forms source, appending an `eval(atob(...))` payload that runs on require(). The decoded payload obfuscates its strings via \\uXXXX escapes and dynamically requires http/https and child_process. At import time it queries Ethereum public RPCs and eth.blockscout.com/api for transactions from a hardcoded wallet (0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a), decodes an attacker-controlled IPv4 address from a transaction's `to` field, fetches an XOR-encrypted command from that IP via an `x-payload-b64` header, and executes the result through `eval` and a detached `spawn('node', ['-e',...])`. This is a full-host remote code execution channel on the installer, with the C2 endpoint rotatable via on-chain transactions (EtherHiding pattern) and the malicious code grafted onto a legitimate library to evade casual review.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-12T15:41:57+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-12T16:03:34.3252882+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"tailwind-form-templates","ranges":[],"versions":["0.7.4"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/tailwind-form-templates/v/0.7.4"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13923","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13923","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13923"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}