{"id":"MAL-2026-13939","revision":"64f9b898b8d241bdba3b2d92d6d98f0e","records":[{"revision":"64f9b898b8d241bdba3b2d92d6d98f0e","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13939","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @leonardo0902/vortex-kit (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1707e031a6c470479ecbd0b01a480cc801a9d049a3732abc265ccad8791272a9)\nThe main module in @leonardo0902/vortex-kit@12.0.2 issues an HTTPS request to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at 31.97.137.157:45000/icons/116 and passes the returned `credits` field to `new Function('require',..., 'Promise', data.credits)`, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node context (require, process, Buffer) whenever the module is loaded and its exported function is invoked. The fetch destination is disguised as a static-asset endpoint: the file defines a decoy `setDefaultModule` referencing legitimate CDNs (cloudflare, fastly, akamai, cloudfront) and a font-awesome path, then reuses the identical variable names (`protocol`, `domain`, `path`, `head`, `bearrtoken: 'logo'`) around the bare-IP fetch-and-eval to frame it as an icon download. Bundled native dependencies (@primno/dpapi, better-sqlite3, node-machine-id) are consistent with a dynamically delivered browser-credential-stealer payload. The remote code is unpinned, unverified, and controlled entirely by whoever operates the IP.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-13T17:22:30+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-13T17:30:12.5294556+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@leonardo0902/vortex-kit","ranges":[],"versions":["12.0.2"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@leonardo0902/vortex-kit/v/12.0.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13939","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13939","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13939"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}