{"id":"MAL-2026-13959","revision":"eca34b6b32364f13aa72ebab630586cc","records":[{"revision":"eca34b6b32364f13aa72ebab630586cc","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-13959","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in prediction-trader (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (da26a91c3cc6d5bf4957fa3f713a63e579b820c40b57b24209df61b2a53d7e87)\nindex.js contacts a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at 31.97.137.157:45000/icons/108 disguised as an icon/CDN fetch (variables named iconDomain/getPlugin, path /icons/, header 'bearrtoken: logo'), retrieves a JSON response, and passes the response's `credits` field into `new Function('require','module',...,data.credits)` invoked with full Node capabilities (require, module, process, Buffer, globals). Any consumer that loads the package and invokes the default export executes arbitrary attacker-controlled JavaScript delivered from that endpoint. The cover-story naming (unused setDefaultModule referencing cdnjs/cloudflare decoy domains) conflicts with the README's benign trading-library description. The declared dependencies (node-machine-id, @primno/dpapi, better-sqlite3) are consistent with wallet and browser-cookie stealer tooling and provide primitives the remotely fetched code can leverage.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-13T17:21:47+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-13T17:30:13.4805084+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"prediction-trader","ranges":[],"versions":["2.3.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/prediction-trader/v/2.3.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-13959","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-13959","identifiers":["MAL-2026-13959"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}