{"id":"MAL-2026-14049","revision":"d7f7836c0ebe4cb7a8937e8a992b157b","records":[{"revision":"d7f7836c0ebe4cb7a8937e8a992b157b","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-14049","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @mexc/shared-utils (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c6d793d1ff65b7f5a24e1aa0c176eaa5d83c7870e05cca5b64f22edb9ca7ded7)\nPackage published to the public npm registry under the @mexc scope without evidence of scope ownership. package.json declares a postinstall hook (\"postinstall\": \"node postinstall.js\") that runs on any installer whose resolver falls back to the public registry when resolving @mexc/shared-utils. The postinstall script collects host metadata — os.hostname(), os.userInfo().username, process.getuid(), process.cwd(), platform, node version, and multiple npm_* environment variables (npm_config_registry, npm_config_user_agent, npm_execpath, INIT_CWD) — and writes the data to os.tmpdir()/mexc-poc-execution-proof.json. The current shipped script performs local write only with no outbound network call, but the install-time code-execution primitive against any CI/build system that resolves the @mexc scope publicly is the classic dependency-confusion pattern; the author controls the code that runs and can change the payload in any future version.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-14T20:04:39+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-14T20:31:47.5534094+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@mexc/shared-utils","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@mexc/shared-utils/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-14049","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-14049","identifiers":["MAL-2026-14049"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}