{"id":"MAL-2026-14166","revision":"5a297ab18e6a44f0ac8b86d6efdefa72","records":[{"revision":"5a297ab18e6a44f0ac8b86d6efdefa72","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-14166","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in chalk-es (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (9a278b0c90f55a6a518b61ec1c964468011d1e4be184df5f36336a5f82ea58cc)\nPackage name mimics `chalk` but ships an empty library body; the only real behavior lives in `scripts/postinstall.js`. On install the script XOR-decodes (key `stf2026`) a hardcoded GitHub URL and downloads a Windows binary to `%TEMP%\\main.exe`, then spawns it detached. On WSL/Linux hosts an XOR-decoded bridge command is exec'd to reach the underlying Windows host and run the same payload from inside Linux. The postinstall also POSTs a JSON body containing the resolved platform label (with WSL detection) to a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint at `http://193.70.34.101:20099/vote`, serving as an install beacon/victim tracker. Four byte-array constants (ADDON_ENC, BRIDGE_LAUNCHER_ENC, BRIDGE_SCRIPT_PRE_ENC, BRIDGE_SCRIPT_POST_ENC) are XOR-decoded at runtime specifically to hide the fetch URL and the Windows/WSL execution command.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-18T23:58:23+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-19T00:30:17.9524955+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"chalk-es","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/chalk-es/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-14166","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-14166","identifiers":["MAL-2026-14166"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}