{"id":"MAL-2026-14175","revision":"92f90359842c49b5887a6f8b553cff45","records":[{"revision":"92f90359842c49b5887a6f8b553cff45","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-14175","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in core-js-gns (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (ae5eadad92952db436b03dd9673b34d203d9296b0913389de2aa0d9fef441631)\nThe package's postinstall hook (`package.json` → `node init.js`) runs an installer-side dropper. init.js gates on developer-machine heuristics (presence of Desktop/Documents/Downloads directories) and a 24-hour skip marker, then POSTs hostname, username, platform, architecture, Node version, OS release, and package name/version to https://core-js-buffer.domaup-com.workers.dev/report. It then HTTP GETs an AES-256-GCM ciphertext from the same host with TLS verification disabled (`rejectUnauthorized: false`), decrypts it with a key derived from a hardcoded seed, checks the plaintext contains the cover-story string `TelemetrySender`, writes the result to `~/.cache/core-js-buffer/modules/runtime.py`, and spawns Python detached (`stdio:'ignore'`, `.unref()`) to execute it. The package name mimics the legitimate `core-js` library. Behavior is arbitrary remote code execution on the installer's machine, fetched from an attacker-controlled endpoint at npm install time, preceded by installer identifier exfiltration to the same endpoint.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-19T00:00:05+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-19T00:30:15.889484+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"core-js-gns","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/core-js-gns/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-14175","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-14175","identifiers":["MAL-2026-14175"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}