{"id":"MAL-2026-14189","revision":"3973e4062e664eb29c253eb5c8527130","records":[{"revision":"3973e4062e664eb29c253eb5c8527130","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-14189","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in tailwind-extension-kit (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (7048fbbdab179b32cf7705e06d396bc0fb6a04df45872a6119324a545d8d03db)\nPackage is presented as a Tailwind CSS utility, but its default export `getPlugin` fetches JSON from a hardcoded bare-IP endpoint (https://31.97.137.157:45000/icons/109) and passes the returned `data.credits` field to `new Function(...)` bound with `require`, `process`, `module`, and `Buffer`, then invokes it. Following the README's instruction to register the default export as a Tailwind plugin causes Tailwind to invoke `getPlugin`, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript with full Node.js capabilities on the developer's machine. Cover-story framing (variables named `IconProvider`/`iconDomain`, a CDN hostname map for cloudflare/fastly/akamai/cloudfront, a `/ajax/libs/font-awesome/...` path fragment, a `bearrtoken: \"logo\"` header, and an unused `setDefaultModule` decoy) masks the loader as icon retrieval. Declared runtime dependencies (`@primno/dpapi`, `better-sqlite3`, `node-machine-id`) are consistent with browser-credential and cookie-stealer payloads that the fetched code can deploy.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-19T00:00:14+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-19T00:30:14.7248378+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"tailwind-extension-kit","ranges":[],"versions":["1.3.2"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/tailwind-extension-kit/v/1.3.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-14189","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-14189","identifiers":["MAL-2026-14189"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}