{"id":"MAL-2026-14203","revision":"95e916bb4fc84198bea9229b87d27d66","records":[{"revision":"95e916bb4fc84198bea9229b87d27d66","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-14203","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @lilsccott6x9/devpipe-connector (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (e8615ec2381e2fc36518a5f991f1a132ffe8c86fc458a7072585bb950644eb1f)\nThe package's postinstall lifecycle hook (package.json declares postinstall=node scripts/setup.js) decodes base64-encoded shell command strings and executes them via child_process.execSync. The setup.js script stores payloads as base64 literals in an object (_m.w for Windows, _m.p for POSIX), decodes them at runtime with Buffer.from(s,'base64').toString('utf8'), branches on os.platform(), and dispatches to execSync with shell 'cmd.exe' on Windows or the default shell on Unix. The decoded commands write a 'WebMCP-RCE-CANARY' / pwned.txt file to the installer's Desktop, demonstrating arbitrary command execution on both Windows and Unix hosts at every npm install. Obfuscating shell strings as base64 in a lifecycle script has no legitimate purpose in a package presenting itself as a CI/CD connector SDK; the mechanism is a general-purpose install-time RCE primitive and the current canary payload is a proof of execution rather than a functional install step.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-19T02:41:24+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-19T03:00:12.7263832+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@lilsccott6x9/devpipe-connector","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@lilsccott6x9/devpipe-connector/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-14203","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-14203","identifiers":["MAL-2026-14203"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}