{"id":"MAL-2026-14237","revision":"340fc2b867154b4495d4f349625e2c31","records":[{"revision":"340fc2b867154b4495d4f349625e2c31","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-14237","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in gaarf-bq (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (841d3bc6f2f6b55bfe6c3d3ffd5daf2eb586507bbe35ff5ab8e706db076357d0)\nOn npm install, the package's postinstall lifecycle script collects installer host identifiers (os.hostname(), process.platform, process.arch, Node version, and package metadata) and POSTs them to a hardcoded endpoint at vpx0x956.instances.poc.jchunt.top (path /gaarf-bq) via https.request. The destination is not caller-configurable and is not related to any documented purpose of the package. The package name resembles Google's ads-api-report-fetcher (gaarf) BigQuery component, consistent with dependency-confusion scaffolding that lures internal builds into resolving this public name and beaconing back host fingerprints. A self-description as a security-research canary does not change the observed behavior: installer-owned identifiers leave the machine to an author-controlled host without opt-in.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-19T03:48:25+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-19T04:00:16.9086518+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"gaarf-bq","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/gaarf-bq/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-14237","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-14237","identifiers":["MAL-2026-14237"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}