{"id":"MAL-2026-14258","revision":"17f707622eb84272a1f8a0f7f494a12d","records":[{"revision":"17f707622eb84272a1f8a0f7f494a12d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-14258","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in ranux-cloud (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5c2844c37c95371d0fa96d0a814be948335590d5b65500a8f4b2a577c8748e23)\nThe package main (index.js) is obfuscator.io-transformed with a rotated string-array decoder and, at top level, uses createDecipheriv with a hardcoded AES key/iv/aad to decrypt an embedded ~2.3 MB opaque blob. The decrypted bytes are executed via a top-level `await import('data:'+...)` and the resulting module is re-exported as `startRanuxEngine`, so any consumer that requires or imports ranux-cloud immediately runs the hidden payload with no user interaction. In addition, package.json redirects the well-known dependency `@whiskeysockets/baileys` to `github:rcedubot/X` — an unrelated personal GitHub repository, unpinned to any commit SHA — so `npm install` pulls arbitrary code from that repo (including any lifecycle scripts) into the installer's dependency tree in place of the legitimate Baileys library. The combination of encrypted-payload import-time execution, heavy obfuscation of the loader, and a dependency-hijack pointing a namespaced dep at an attacker-controlled GitHub tree is the canonical loader/dropper shape.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-19T04:59:46+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-19T05:31:27.6970858+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"ranux-cloud","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/ranux-cloud/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-14258","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-14258","identifiers":["MAL-2026-14258"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}