{"id":"MAL-2026-14346","revision":"9cd25599927745b3aacc8d532c2d5758","records":[{"revision":"9cd25599927745b3aacc8d532c2d5758","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-14346","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @next-fonts/font (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (4e536e77176d5fb4637105c50280763e82a6a273dd7de35bb82da340b0f71163)\n@next-fonts/font is a typosquat of Next.js's @next/font. Its exported Inter() function (mimicking next/font/google) decodes a base64 blob via atob(), then executes it through spawn('node','-e', code) with an eval(code) fallback. The decoded payload uses on-chain data as a C2 channel: it queries api.trongrid.io or fullnode.mainnet.aptoslabs.com for a transaction tied to hardcoded wallet addresses, retrieves that transaction's input data from BSC RPC endpoints (bsc-dataseed.binance.org, bsc-rpc.publicnode.com) via eth_getTransactionByHash, XOR-decrypts the returned bytes, and evals the resulting JavaScript. The result is arbitrary attacker-controlled code execution on any Node process that imports the package and invokes Inter(), with no relation to font functionality. Obfuscation (base64-hidden payload, node -e detached spawn with eval fallback, blockchain-mediated fetch) conceals the downloader from casual inspection.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-21T04:28:59+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-21T05:01:06.9534171+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@next-fonts/font","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.1","1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@next-fonts/font/v/1.0.1","https://www.npmjs.com/package/@next-fonts/font/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-14346","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-14346","identifiers":["MAL-2026-14346"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}