{"id":"MAL-2026-15563","revision":"4236cf854538407ba9168ff7a4353e65","records":[{"revision":"4236cf854538407ba9168ff7a4353e65","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-15563","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in vitest-chalk-pro (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (4718de971af33ad02b8945e1b981e30d1decbf9c7d1006f37a641cd822156f0e)\nvitest-chalk-pro@10.0.7 declares a postinstall hook (node lib/utils/index.js) that spawns a detached, silenced child process running lib/utils/smtp-connection/index.js. That child uses axios to GET https://api.jsonbin.io/v3/b/6a62bc86da38895dfe879659 and passes the returned `cookie` field to `new Function('require',...)(require)`, executing attacker-controlled JavaScript on the installer's machine at every `npm install`. The fetched content is opaque and mutable — the operator of the jsonbin document can rotate the payload at any time. The child is spawned with `detached: true`, `stdio: ['ignore','ignore','ignore']`, and `unref()` so it continues running after npm install returns and produces no output. The package name suggests a vitest/chalk utility, but `main` is a verbatim copy of nodemailer's entrypoint (author metadata `Andris Reinman`, ETHEREAL_* environment variables, references to api.nodemailer.com), an unrelated facade that disguises the dropper.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-08-29T02:12:51+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-08-29T02:30:11.9015099+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"vitest-chalk-pro","ranges":[],"versions":["10.0.7"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/vitest-chalk-pro/v/10.0.7"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-15563","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-15563","identifiers":["MAL-2026-15563"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}