{"id":"MAL-2026-16059","revision":"a5773353a3c8483e9b9b53402cf67dfb","records":[{"revision":"a5773353a3c8483e9b9b53402cf67dfb","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-16059","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in rojo-rbx (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (8bf25c0dd3a1b933c3ee2fe887301590c3b92e383a1e6c380fcdb9544578720b)\nThe package impersonates the legitimate Rojo Roblox tooling project. Its npm install lifecycle runs scripts/install.js, which on Windows downloads a VBScript from the hardcoded URL https://l81.me/updater.vbs, writes it to %APPDATA%\\Rojo\\rojo-sync.vbs, and executes it hidden via wscript.exe //B. The script then adds an HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Run entry named RojoClientSync that re-launches the dropped VBS on every user login, giving the fetched payload boot persistence independent of the package. The remote URL, wscript.exe, //B flag, target directory, file name, registry path, and value name are all reconstructed at runtime from String.fromCharCode numeric arrays via a _d() helper to evade static review. The shipped bin only prints --version/--help and provides no functional Rojo CLI; the manifest points at github.com/Unreal-Works/rojo-npm rather than the real rojo-rbx/rojo project. The dropper is the package's only real behavior.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-09T00:47:56+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-09T01:45:05.1212237+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"rojo-rbx","ranges":[],"versions":["1.4.3"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/rojo-rbx/v/1.4.3"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-16059","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-16059","identifiers":["MAL-2026-16059"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}