{"id":"MAL-2026-16064","revision":"ca917c07c77a45a6a9c9ee84db3a543f","records":[{"revision":"ca917c07c77a45a6a9c9ee84db3a543f","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-16064","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in bx-ui-view (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (ce3874d2c55544bbbf59b6a60c3002b13e242fb53160a455597b13fdd37231f8)\npackage.json declares a dependency whose key equals the package's own name (bx-ui-view) and whose value is a plain HTTPS URL (https://package-access.pages.dev/bx-ui-view) rather than a registry version range. On `npm install`, npm resolves this URL, downloads whatever tarball is served, and executes any lifecycle scripts inside it — with no version pin, no integrity check, and no hash/signature verification. The shipped index.js is a 3-line inert stub, so the manifest line is the entire published surface: the installer receives whatever content the operator of package-access.pages.dev chooses to serve at install time. The self-name + off-registry URL + stub source combination is the dependency-confusion / smuggled-payload shape, and the pages.dev host is unrelated to any registry or declared publisher domain.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-09T01:41:04+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-09T02:00:04.5753425+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"bx-ui-view","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/bx-ui-view/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-16064","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-16064","identifiers":["MAL-2026-16064"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}