{"id":"MAL-2026-16291","revision":"79998446b4ab4c389b8e81c7c39e02ec","records":[{"revision":"79998446b4ab4c389b8e81c7c39e02ec","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-16291","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @shared-runtime/modules (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (bc6095cf4766c948193c22d8c0e775010fc3ab47733a1020fb8fd5367d88e5e9)\n@shared-runtime/modules@9.9.10 collects the installer's OS username (os.userInfo().username), hostname (os.hostname()) and current working-directory basename, then issues a dns.resolve4() query against a subdomain assembled as srmods.<user>.<host>.<cwd>.<ts>.oob.algamil7x.xyz, leaking those values via authoritative DNS logs at the attacker-controlled domain oob.algamil7x.xyz. The destination hostname, the OS/DNS API names, and the module names are stored as hex byte arrays in lib/a74d1f.js and lib/f63c0e.js and reconstructed at runtime via String.fromCharCode, with os and dns loaded through module.constructor._load to avoid literal require() strings. Execution is triggered both at install (package.json scripts.install=\"node index.js\") and on require() (index.js top-level require('./lib/core.js')), with a swallowed try/catch so npm install still reports success. The README claims no hidden network calls in module scope while module scope performs exactly that.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-18T20:25:02+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-18T20:45:06.5311943+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@shared-runtime/modules","ranges":[],"versions":["9.9.10"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@shared-runtime/modules/v/9.9.10"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-16291","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-16291","identifiers":["MAL-2026-16291"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}