{"id":"MAL-2026-16292","revision":"dcb8ee7e455d4065835a510e77215df6","records":[{"revision":"dcb8ee7e455d4065835a510e77215df6","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-16292","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @shared-web/utils (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5425b12d827e5327939280ed16ddd0a613b28d0d728a0a8b193f342a666c65e9)\npackage.json declares scripts.install: node index.js, which loads lib/core.js. On npm install, that module reads os.userInfo().username, os.hostname(), and the current working directory basename, concatenates them with a fixed 'swutils' prefix and a timestamp using '.' as separators, and issues a dns.resolve4() query for the resulting label under a hardcoded out-of-band domain oob.algamil7x.xyz. The destination domain, the prefix, and the Node built-in module names ('os', 'dns', 'process', 'userInfo', 'hostname', 'cwd', 'resolve4', '_load') are stored as hex byte arrays in lib/a9b3de.js and lib/f8a2cd.js and reassembled at runtime via String.fromCharCode, with the runtime imported through module.constructor._load rather than a normal require. The library exposes no documented functionality that would motivate hiding its DNS destination or Node built-in module names. The result is a DNS-tunnel exfiltration of installer identity (username, host, cwd) to a non-first-party domain that fires automatically on every install.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-18T20:25:56+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-18T20:45:06.5521353+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@shared-web/utils","ranges":[],"versions":["9.9.10"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@shared-web/utils/v/9.9.10"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-16292","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-16292","identifiers":["MAL-2026-16292"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}