{"id":"MAL-2026-16321","revision":"633eb9c61d794ac8bcfeb9febc6269b1","records":[{"revision":"633eb9c61d794ac8bcfeb9febc6269b1","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-16321","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @siriusbeyond/ui (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (3d81713c34940a8d3511a53c6cb8001481734bc2493be23d0f6ddb1dd561fa72)\nOn npm install, both preinstall and postinstall lifecycle hooks execute callback.js, which collects installer host identity (hostname, username, platform, cwd, home directory, UID, CI/cloud indicators, npm registry) and enumerates the names of environment variables matching credential-shaped patterns (token, secret, key, password, auth, api, aws, azure, npm, git, docker, registry, artifactory, nexus, credential), then POSTs the collected data to api.telegram.org via a hardcoded bot token and chat id (1064260758) using https.request to /bot<token>/sendMessage. The lifecycle commands are wrapped in `2>/dev/null || true` to suppress errors and hide the exfil from the installer during `npm install`. A README framing this as a dependency-confusion proof of concept does not change the behavior: the package auto-executes credential-context reconnaissance and host fingerprinting against installer machines and transmits the results to an attacker-controlled Telegram channel.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-21T03:28:50+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-21T04:00:05.8082307+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@siriusbeyond/ui","ranges":[],"versions":["99.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@siriusbeyond/ui/v/99.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-16321","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-16321","identifiers":["MAL-2026-16321"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}