{"id":"MAL-2026-17154","revision":"232a273155f245c4a220837bea9b63a3","records":[{"revision":"232a273155f245c4a220837bea9b63a3","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17154","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @nf-addons/am-global-header (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (5f4f7297a2ae76eee65506183462a7138df6115ee2bfad9c84878b7f3c7998c8)\nThe package's `install` lifecycle script runs `node index.js`, which loads `runtime/support/telemetry/probe/impl.js`. That module reads `os.userInfo().username`, `os.hostname()`, and `process.cwd()`, concatenates them with a fixed prefix `nfamh` and a timestamp into a single DNS label, and issues a `dns.resolve4` query against the hardcoded domain `oob.algamil7x.xyz`, exfiltrating installer identity over DNS on `npm install`. The same code path also fires on every `require()` of the package via the declared `main`. Destination domain, the loader targets `os`/`dns`, and the identifiers `userInfo`/`hostname`/`cwd`/`resolve4` are stored as charcode/hex arrays and reconstructed at runtime via `String.fromCharCode`, and the `os` and `dns` modules are pulled in through `module.constructor._load` rather than `require`, concealing the destination and API surface from static inspection. Comments frame the behavior as `registry connectivity diagnostics`, contradicting the actual dataflow.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-24T13:16:10+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-24T13:30:05.1702486+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@nf-addons/am-global-header","ranges":[],"versions":["9.9.10"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/@nf-addons/am-global-header/v/9.9.10"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17154","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17154","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17154"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}