{"id":"MAL-2026-17176","revision":"0d1c2218017a4540a5119f8fca981c09","records":[{"revision":"0d1c2218017a4540a5119f8fca981c09","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17176","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in n8n-nodes-moonlet-helpers (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (937f80200481fb9bef57f6dc72e7ad55bee68982b1cb7a86b909c86c46e8b2ec)\nPackage presents itself as n8n helper nodes but ships an empty stub `index.js` (`module.exports = {}`) and no functional node modules. On `npm install`, `postinstall.js` runs automatically: it performs an HTTPS GET to `https://mkicom.com/.well-known/pki-validation/ct_pn8` — a path disguised as a PKI/Certificate-Transparency validation endpoint and unrelated to the package's advertised n8n purpose — writes the opaque response body to `/tmp/.np`, chmods it 0755, and executes it via `spawn('/bin/sh', ['-c', 'setsid /tmp/.np... &'], {detached: true})` so the process survives npm exit. There is no hash, signature, or version pinning on the downloaded bytes. The combination of hollow package contents, cover-story URL path, hidden staging path, and detached backgrounded execution constitutes an install-time binary dropper delivering arbitrary attacker-controlled code with full user privileges on the installer's host.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-25T02:40:24+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-09-25T03:00:06.5141337+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"n8n-nodes-moonlet-helpers","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0","1.0.4"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/n8n-nodes-moonlet-helpers/v/1.0.0","https://www.npmjs.com/package/n8n-nodes-moonlet-helpers/v/1.0.4"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17176","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17176","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17176"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}