{"id":"MAL-2026-17374","revision":"7ccd6525ade24f1a9a41c7f4ba8c6ea8","records":[{"revision":"7ccd6525ade24f1a9a41c7f4ba8c6ea8","observedAt":"2026-10-29T14:12:32.841+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17374","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @rennnpm/baileys (npm)","description":"This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical\nforks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into\nthe WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW\nquery (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter\nJIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the\nvictim's account to channels it never asked to join.\n\nThe target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques\nobserved across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code\narray reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote\nJSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change\nafter installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying\nmechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after\nconnect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per\nfork.\n\nThe malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and\nsubscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish\npersistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.\n\nAffected package: @rennnpm/baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.0.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (1147bf0a20408ab406838da0e6aa5a2086deb1afe6651013a6081714ada641ff)\npackage.json declares the `libsignal` dependency as `github:tenka-san/libsignal-node`, a bare GitHub reference to a personal user's fork with no commit SHA, tag, or version constraint. On `npm install`, npm clones the default branch's current HEAD and runs any lifecycle scripts the fetched repository declares, executing that code on the installer's machine with no integrity check. Whoever controls the `tenka-san/libsignal-node` repository can change the code at any time, and every installer of this package will run whatever is at HEAD at that moment. The upstream `@whiskeysockets/baileys` package resolves `libsignal` from the npm registry at a pinned version; substituting a mutable third-party git reference in this fork replaces a registry-integrity-checked dependency with an unpinned attacker-controllable code source.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-29T13:25:19+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-29T13:48:10.6999135+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@rennnpm/baileys","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/","https://www.npmjs.com/package/@rennnpm/baileys/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17374","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17374","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17374"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}