{"id":"MAL-2026-17383","revision":"9368db795c44414daccd86a962cb42ec","records":[{"revision":"9368db795c44414daccd86a962cb42ec","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17383","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in @xatancchii/velycxbail (npm)","description":"This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical\nforks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into\nthe WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW\nquery (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter\nJIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the\nvictim's account to channels it never asked to join.\n\nThe target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques\nobserved across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code\narray reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote\nJSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change\nafter installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying\nmechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after\nconnect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per\nfork.\n\nThe malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and\nsubscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish\npersistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.\n\nAffected package: @xatancchii/velycxbail (npm), version(s): 1.1.0.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (594062e4a945ccd7c67e7a5f03085fbd2eecda766d5347b81e7012399fb1f447)\npackage.json declares `\"libsignal\": \"npm:@bellaxchuu/libsignal-node@latest\"`, aliasing the Signal-protocol crypto dependency to a package published under the unrelated `@bellaxchuu` scope with the mutable `latest` tag and no integrity check. Every `npm install` of @xatancchii/velycxbail resolves libsignal to whatever the current head of `@bellaxchuu/libsignal-node` is at install time. The aliased package is consumed by lib/Utils/crypto.js, which is reached from the main entry through the Utils layer, so arbitrary future content published to that third-party scope loads and executes as part of normal use. The scope does not match the Baileys/WhatsApp publisher chain the fork claims to derive from, so control over the code path executed on installers rests with an unrelated third party.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-04T23:23:32+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-04T23:45:19.4714223+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"@xatancchii/velycxbail","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.1.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/","https://www.npmjs.com/package/@xatancchii/velycxbail/v/1.1.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17383","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17383","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17383"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}