{"id":"MAL-2026-17404","revision":"7a41c0536e344e8e925025e2c1c25b4b","records":[{"revision":"7a41c0536e344e8e925025e2c1c25b4b","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17404","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in saturn-baileys (npm)","description":"This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical\nforks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into\nthe WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW\nquery (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter\nJIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the\nvictim's account to channels it never asked to join.\n\nThe target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques\nobserved across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code\narray reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote\nJSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change\nafter installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying\nmechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after\nconnect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per\nfork.\n\nThe malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and\nsubscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish\npersistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.\n\nAffected package: saturn-baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.0.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (098af0c774d7e3d1a8b2da57e35d5e2686e2149ad6f01fa13803cd1a54325058)\nsaturn-baileys is a fork of the Baileys WhatsApp library. In lib/Socket/messages-send.js at lines 425 and 436, a network destination is reconstructed at runtime from a String.fromCharCode(...) decimal array rather than appearing as a plain string literal. The decoded value is the URL https://fiora.nixel.my.id/. The obfuscation is placed inside the message-send code path of a messaging library that handles user credentials, session data, and message content, and the destination is not a documented WhatsApp/Baileys endpoint. Reconstructing a hardcoded non-first-party host via char-code decoding inside a send routine is the exfiltration/silent-relay shape for messaging-library trojans and is inconsistent with any legitimate use in this location.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-04T23:22:25+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-04T23:45:19.0888536+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"saturn-baileys","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"}]}],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/","https://www.npmjs.com/package/saturn-baileys/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17404","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17404","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17404"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}