{"id":"MAL-2026-17405","revision":"3a867a18ab224608a04c4d6b1dcce1ff","records":[{"revision":"3a867a18ab224608a04c4d6b1dcce1ff","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17405","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in shadowmd (npm)","description":"This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical\nforks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into\nthe WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW\nquery (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter\nJIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the\nvictim's account to channels it never asked to join.\n\nThe target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques\nobserved across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code\narray reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote\nJSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change\nafter installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying\nmechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after\nconnect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per\nfork.\n\nThe malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and\nsubscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish\npersistence, or execute arbitrary remote code.\n\nAffected package: shadowmd (npm), version(s): 8.6.87.\n\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (926dc7dcc164af51175755e81a7a6eabb878244ecc173974ab577a1569ce1ff4)\nlib/Socket/messages-send.js at lines 425 and 436 reconstructs the URL https://fiora.nixel.my.id/ from a String.fromCharCode decimal-ASCII array rather than a plain string literal. The host is assembled inside the package's WhatsApp socket message-send code path, so on every message-send flow the runtime resolves to an off-host destination whose identity is hidden from source-level inspection. Obfuscated destination reconstruction in a messaging library's send path is the fingerprint of a Baileys-family fork that intercepts or mirrors session/message data through an author-controlled endpoint; the destination fiora.nixel.my.id is unrelated to the WhatsApp protocol and is not documented as a caller-configurable endpoint.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-04T23:22:05+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-04T23:45:18.0456985+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"shadowmd","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0"}]}],"versions":["8.6.87"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.ox.security/blog/phantomsub-malicious-npm-campaign-secretly-adds-users-to-whatsapp-spam-channels/","https://www.npmjs.com/package/shadowmd/v/8.6.87"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17405","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17405","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17405"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}