{"id":"MAL-2026-17479","revision":"5dc7665aa38049d7b6ccd0de51207b97","records":[{"revision":"5dc7665aa38049d7b6ccd0de51207b97","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17479","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in css-gap-decorations-polyfill (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (8126656cc344a4f632b8ddf5a23683fc92ac22798bb67e1aed6bca73ac82d7b6)\nThe package is published as a CSS polyfill but ships no polyfill functionality. On require(), thunderboltRegistry.js uses child_process.execSync to run whoami, uname -a, ifconfig/ip addr, and read /etc/hosts, then sends each result along with a beacon (node version, platform, pid) as query parameters to the hardcoded attacker-controlled endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/ef9ea0e191006f3cc6670720c99c26f3. The package exposes stub factories under internal-sounding names (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, documentManagementRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, and others) and bundles a registry-manifest.min.json mapping them all to a single parastorage.com asset, consistent with a dependency-confusion attack targeting a private Wix/Thunderbolt package namespace. Installer harm: host identity, kernel version, network configuration, and /etc/hosts contents are exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled host simply by resolving and loading the package.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-04T23:13:45+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-04T23:30:05.6467002+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"css-gap-decorations-polyfill","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-gap-decorations-polyfill/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17479","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17479","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17479"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}