{"id":"MAL-2026-17480","revision":"7ee9a99c1c8c461ab5b014d07b72a34d","records":[{"revision":"7ee9a99c1c8c461ab5b014d07b72a34d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17480","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in css-interop-observer-polyfill (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (089bdc1dd6bdf0216bb911888e81ce97dc171bdef2588fd5de0aadb4a64fbb2b)\nOn module load, thunderboltRegistry.js executes an IIFE that runs id, whoami, uname, ifconfig/ip addr via child_process.execSync and reads /etc/hosts, then sends each result together with hostname, node version, platform and pid to the hardcoded endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/[token] via fetch over plain HTTP. The package presents itself as a stub exporting proxies for Wix thunderbolt internal registry names (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.), consistent with dependency-confusion targeting of those internal module names while the load-time code performs the host reconnaissance and exfiltration.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-04T23:14:35+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-04T23:30:05.8377476+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"css-interop-observer-polyfill","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-interop-observer-polyfill/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17480","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17480","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17480"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}