{"id":"MAL-2026-17486","revision":"c4f4c81cd60240ef8524e255a63f8b2d","records":[{"revision":"c4f4c81cd60240ef8524e255a63f8b2d","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17486","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in css-scroll-state-polyfill (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (cffa0affc34bac3fa24fcc7c67aae4d120066f4f856cb8b637bc04c6ca9d482c)\nThe package presents itself as a CSS polyfill but ships a payload file (thunderboltRegistry.js) that executes an IIFE at require time. The IIFE uses child_process to run host-identification commands (id, whoami, uname -a, ifconfig/ip addr, /etc/hosts, hostname) and collects Node version, platform, and PID, then sends the captured data via fetch to a hardcoded webhook.site collector at https://webhook.site/0492a36c-4d7b-408a-865c-226db25987ba. The main index.js is an empty stub; filenames mimic internal Wix Thunderbolt registry modules, consistent with a dependency-confusion squat targeting that namespace. A self-identifying 'beacon=poc15' tag is included in the request. The payload also walks require.cache and deletes any entry whose key contains 'thunderboltRegistry', causing subsequent requires in the same process to re-execute the recon-and-exfiltration path rather than return a cached export, and exports a Proxy that answers arbitrary method accesses to blend in with the impersonated registry.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-04T23:15:41+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-04T23:30:04.6699136+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"css-scroll-state-polyfill","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-scroll-state-polyfill/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17486","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17486","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17486"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}