{"id":"MAL-2026-17488","revision":"b716134a59394ba6ad35fb06b3116de2","records":[{"revision":"b716134a59394ba6ad35fb06b3116de2","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17488","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in css-starting-style-polyfill (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (713c302594ab7c41e8034ca95478045afafba98e223ea62def160f080cb879cd)\nthunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE on module load that executes host reconnaissance commands via child_process.execSync (id, whoami, uname -a, ifconfig/ip addr, cat /etc/hosts) and transmits the collected output together with hostname, platform, and pid to a hardcoded external URL https://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f via fetch. The package exports factories under names matching Wix internal registry modules (thunderboltRegistry, corvidRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, documentManagementRegistry) and ships a manifest referencing parastorage.com URLs, so any environment loading it as a drop-in Wix thunderbolt registry triggers the exfiltration payload on require(). The declared CSS @starting-style polyfill purpose has no relationship to the shipped behavior.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-04T23:15:24+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-04T23:30:05.6156055+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"css-starting-style-polyfill","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-starting-style-polyfill/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17488","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17488","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17488"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}