{"id":"MAL-2026-17503","revision":"90fe8ee5bf4f4ab092b5bd49a724906f","records":[{"revision":"90fe8ee5bf4f4ab092b5bd49a724906f","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17503","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in dom-focus-sentinel (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (7baf5178b3cd02ae8e6e2c01e8cf305fd9670118428c4d3ef94ac0caef6fc4e8)\nthunderboltRegistry.js runs an immediately-invoked function at module load that uses child_process.execSync to run host reconnaissance commands (whoami, id, pwd, ifconfig, ip addr, cat /etc/hosts, hostname) and transmits each command's output, along with Node version, platform, and pid, via fetch GET requests to the hardcoded plain-HTTP endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/ef9ea0e191006f3cc6670720c99c26f3. The package also structurally impersonates Wix internal registry modules by exporting factories keyed on thunderboltRegistry/siteAssetsRegistry/documentManagementRegistry/editorRegistry/corvidRegistry and shipping a manifest with static.parastorage.com unpkg URLs under dom-focus-sentinel@1.0.0, so the exfiltration IIFE fires whenever a consumer requires any of these registry names. The reconnaissance behavior is unrelated to the declared focus-sentinel purpose, and a `beacon=rce-poc` marker is embedded in the exfil traffic.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-04T23:28:40+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-04T23:45:19.9122211+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"dom-focus-sentinel","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/dom-focus-sentinel/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17503","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17503","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17503"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}