{"id":"MAL-2026-17521","revision":"5069a3ecf5254521a39435c893c8459c","records":[{"revision":"5069a3ecf5254521a39435c893c8459c","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17521","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in rgx33-flex-layout-core (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (02200327d66cf0661b787f58049b55b5fbb95dfb76fbb81a679cc71439bd85eb)\nPackage name and exports (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.) impersonate internal Wix thunderbolt registry packages, targeting Wix build pipelines via dependency confusion. On require, thunderboltRegistry.js executes `id` and `uname -r` via child_process.execSync and collects hostname, pid, Node.js version, and platform. These values are encoded into subdomains of an attacker-controlled Interactsh/OAST callback domain (davdpb8lhot13kgmnhp0863x9g83mpswq.oast.live) and also POSTed to a webhook.site collector (webhook.site/0492a36c-4d7b-408a-865c-226db25987ba). The exfiltration behavior has no relation to the package's advertised 'flexbox layout utilities' purpose, and the manifest references to static.parastorage.com paths reinforce the Wix-targeted dependency-confusion shape.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-04T23:25:38+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-04T23:45:19.0072132+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"rgx33-flex-layout-core","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/rgx33-flex-layout-core/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17521","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17521","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17521"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}