{"id":"MAL-2026-17524","revision":"af86a42c450d434997833e705551a848","records":[{"revision":"af86a42c450d434997833e705551a848","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17524","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in tailwindcss-forms-styles (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (587d9a389f35a8ec2d3ed714c90f7daa43feb6875f4ce2e4280f5ce19569d895)\nThe package name tailwindcss-forms-styles mimics the legitimate @tailwindcss/forms plugin, and its src/index.js copies that plugin's code verbatim as cover. Above the cover code, a top-level IIFE joins a ~140-element base64 string array, atob()-decodes it, and eval()s the result. The decoded loader queries public Ethereum RPC/Blockscout endpoints for the most recent transaction sent by hardcoded address 0xa322E5f3D311D3080e6f0121063e9aDC2490Ef1a, parses two IPv4 addresses out of the transaction recipient field, downloads an XOR-encoded JavaScript payload from staging URLs of the form http://<ip>:443/0x/cls and http://<ip>:443/0x/ls, and executes it via eval and a detached spawn('node', ['-e',...]) child process. Because the IIFE runs at module load, any consumer that performs require('tailwindcss-forms-styles') triggers remote code execution on the installer, with the command-and-control endpoint resolved dynamically from the blockchain so the C2 can be rotated without changing the package.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-04T23:25:12+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-04T23:45:18.5049038+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"tailwindcss-forms-styles","ranges":[],"versions":["0.5.1"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/tailwindcss-forms-styles/v/0.5.1"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17524","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17524","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17524"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}