{"id":"MAL-2026-17547","revision":"f6ee30a4c3494d8a817dc5ccb2792598","records":[{"revision":"f6ee30a4c3494d8a817dc5ccb2792598","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17547","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in css-at-scope-polyfill (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (c4d8d974b7fabf04fa662971cd8041fb76775bf5ed2902cbbffed0f881e2036d)\nPackage is published under a CSS-polyfill name but ships thunderboltRegistry.js, which exports Wix internal registry module names (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, etc.) so that a build resolving any of those names will load this file. On require(), an IIFE runs child_process.execSync to collect `id`, `whoami`, `uname`, `ifconfig`/`ip addr`, and the contents of /etc/hosts, plus a beacon containing node version, platform, pid, and hostname, and POSTs the output via fetch to the hardcoded HTTP endpoint http://dxpoc.gt.tc/callback.php/bb8968d0f67000433bf7005dd5ad2d1f. The payload clears any require.cache entries referencing 'thunderboltRegistry' and acquires child_process through three fallbacks, including instantiating a new Module via module.constructor to bypass mocks or sandboxes. The declared CSS-polyfill purpose has no relation to this behavior; the shape is a dependency-confusion squat against internal Wix modules.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-05T03:37:15+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-05T04:15:05.2001249+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"css-at-scope-polyfill","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-at-scope-polyfill/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17547","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17547","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17547"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}