{"id":"MAL-2026-17576","revision":"c9e8b1c86daf4875b0cea50c8701fb76","records":[{"revision":"c9e8b1c86daf4875b0cea50c8701fb76","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:17:17.793+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"MAL-2026-17576","aliases":[],"title":"Malicious code in css-nrmgzn-polyfill (npm)","description":"\n---\n_-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_\n\n## Source: amazon-inspector (4522148c469356aa7799c831ce547d2ae612ac40621e5110ad5d5125bf2f2684)\nThe package presents itself as a CSS polyfill but on require() of thunderboltRegistry.js runs an IIFE that invokes child_process.execSync for id, whoami, uname, ifconfig, and cat /etc/hosts, and sends the command output together with os.hostname(), node version, platform and pid to a hardcoded Burp Collaborator subdomain at https://unl9pgk6ei4uf80n5tf4iktspjvbuzkn9.oastify.com/. The package also exports modules named after internal Wix thunderbolt registries (thunderboltRegistry, siteAssetsRegistry, editorRegistry, corvidRegistry, documentManagementRegistry) and ships a manifest referencing static.parastorage.com paths for css-nrmgzn-polyfill, consistent with a dependency-confusion lure positioned to resolve in place of a private internal module in a Wix build or CI environment. Loading the package yields host reconnaissance exfiltration to an attacker-controlled OAST domain, with no polyfill functionality actually implemented.\n","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-05T16:15:10+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-05T16:31:38.2918981+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"npm","name":"css-nrmgzn-polyfill","ranges":[],"versions":["1.0.0"],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://www.npmjs.com/package/css-nrmgzn-polyfill/v/1.0.0"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/MAL-2026-17576","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:MAL-2026-17576","identifiers":["MAL-2026-17576"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}