{"id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0333","revision":"9e73ae516d80403dbd73ba5b03ff94e7","records":[{"revision":"9e73ae516d80403dbd73ba5b03ff94e7","observedAt":"2026-10-24T13:19:54.901+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0333","aliases":["GHSA-4xcc-23fx-w2wj"],"title":"Resource budgets not enforced on the typed deserialization path","description":"`ParserConfig::max_events`, `max_nodes`, `max_total_scalar_bytes`,\n`max_merge_keys`, `alias_anchor_ratio` and the alias jump factor were\nenforced only by the two `Value` loaders. A typed target with a\ndefault-shaped configuration is served by the streaming deserializer,\nwhich never read those fields, so tightening any of them had no effect\non `from_str::<T>` for a struct target. The default document-length,\ndepth and alias-count caps were enforced on every path, so no input was\nunbounded; the gap affects callers who tightened the other budgets for\nhostile input.\n\nVersion 0.0.53 charges every budget on the streaming path as well and\nadds cross-path parity tests.\n\nUsers who cannot upgrade can deserialize into `noyalib::Value` first and\nconvert with `from_value`, or rely on `max_document_length` and\n`max_depth`, which were always applied on every path.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-10-06T12:00:00+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-10-08T15:00:03.2043569+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","name":"noyalib","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0.0.0-0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.0.53"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://crates.io/crates/noyalib","https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0333.html","https://github.com/sebastienrousseau/noyalib/pull/470"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0333","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0333","identifiers":["RUSTSEC-2026-0333","GHSA-4xcc-23fx-w2wj"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}