{"id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0488","revision":"7d79946c2dda47e4a09939cc890d2c77","records":[{"revision":"7d79946c2dda47e4a09939cc890d2c77","observedAt":"2026-11-12T09:55:27.764+00:00","statement":{"source":"osv","id":"RUSTSEC-2026-0488","aliases":["CVE-2026-123571","GHSA-x962-5xwx-fr8x"],"title":"Integer underflow when reporting a malformed TSIG record","description":"When a TSIG record is decoded from the DNS wire format, its MAC length and \"other data\" length are checked against the end of the record data. If a check failed, the error value was built from `end_idx - decoder.index()`. For a malformed record the decoder can already be past `end_idx`, so this unsigned subtraction underflows.\n\nIn builds with overflow checks enabled (the `dev` profile by default) the underflow panics, so a peer that sends a crafted TSIG record can crash the process. In builds without overflow checks the result wraps and is only used in the returned error.\n\nThe fix returns a plain \"insufficient bytes\" error without the subtraction. It is in 0.26.2.","state":0,"publishedAt":"2026-09-03T12:00:00+00:00","modifiedAt":"2026-11-12T09:45:02.5345913+00:00","affected":[{"ecosystem":"crates.io","name":"hickory-proto","ranges":[{"type":"SEMVER","events":[{"kind":"introduced","version":"0.26.0"},{"kind":"fixed","version":"0.26.2"}]}],"versions":[],"rawVersionEvidence":null}],"metrics":[],"references":["https://crates.io/crates/hickory-proto","https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2026-0488.html","https://github.com/hickory-dns/hickory-dns/commit/b1246a8a21b6dcc34d427a7d39dd96e10825c384"],"sourceUrl":"https://osv.dev/vulnerability/RUSTSEC-2026-0488","license":"OSV · upstream source license applies","key":"osv:RUSTSEC-2026-0488","identifiers":["RUSTSEC-2026-0488","CVE-2026-123571","GHSA-x962-5xwx-fr8x"]},"retained":false,"historicalAffected":[]}],"coverage":[]}