Better Auth: Stale sessions persist after user deletion across admin, anonymous, and SCIM flows
Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
osv · GHSA-2vg6-77g8-24mp
Published### Am I affected? Users are affected if all of the following are true: - They configure `secondaryStorage` on `betterAuth(...)` (Redis, KV, or any external session cache). - `session.storeSessionInDatabase` is left unset or set to `false` (the default). - Their application's deployment uses one or more of: - The `admin` plugin and calls `auth.api.removeUser(...)` or `authClient.admin.removeUser(...)`. - The `anonymous` plugin and exposes `/delete-anonymous-user` or relies on the after-link hook to clean up the anonymous user. - The `@better-auth/scim` plugin and exposes `DELETE /scim/v2/Users/:userId`. If `storeSessionInDatabase` is `true`, sessions are also written to the database, and the database delete cascades; users are not affected. Fix: 1. Upgrade to `better-auth@<patched-version>` or later (and `@better-auth/scim@<patched-version>` if they use SCIM). 2. If they cannot upgrade, see workarounds below. ### Summary When `secondaryStorage` is configured and `storeSessionInDatabase` is `false`, three user-deletion endpoints in `better-auth` plus one in `@better-auth/scim` call `internalAdapter.deleteUser(userId)` without first calling `internalAdapter.deleteSessions(userId)`. The deleted user's session payload (which carries a cached user object) remains in secondary storage, and `internalAdapter.findSession(token)` keeps returning it as a valid session until the session TTL elapses (default 7 days). ### Details The vulnerable call sites are: - `admin` plugin's `removeUser` (`packages/better-auth/src/plugins/admin/routes.ts:1463`). - `anonymous` plugin's self-delete endpoint (`packages/better-auth/src/plugins/anonymous/index.ts:222`). - `anonymous` plugin's after-link hook (`packages/better-auth/src/plugins/anonymous/index.ts:325`). - `@better-auth/scim`'s `DELETE /scim/v2/Users/:userId` (`packages/scim/src/routes.ts:1019`). Working callers that already do the right thing: the core `/delete-user` self-delete and `/delete-user/callback` (`packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/update-user.ts:551`). The fix shape extends each vulnerable caller to invoke `deleteSessions(userId)` before `deleteUser(userId)`. The architectural follow-up centralizes the cleanup inside `deleteUser` itself or introduces a single `deleteUserAndSessions` orchestrator so future callers cannot regress this contract. ### Patches Fixed in `better-auth@<patched-version>` and `@better-auth/scim@<patched-version>`. All four user-deletion call sites now invoke `deleteSessions(userId)` before `deleteUser(userId)` so sessions are evicted from secondary storage at the same time the user row is removed. ### Workarounds If users cannot upgrade immediately: - **Configuration-level**: set `session.storeSessionInDatabase: true`. Subsequent user-delete writes reach the session table and the database cascade removes rows. Increases write volume for high-throughput sessions but eliminates the gap. - **Code-level (admin path)**: when calling `auth.api.removeUser`, also call `auth.api.revokeUserSessions({ body: { userId } })`, which uses `deleteSessions` internally. - **Code-level (SCIM path)**: wrap their SCIM provider's deprovisioning hook to call `auth.api.revokeUserSessions(...)` after the SCIM DELETE. - **Code-level (anonymous path)**: in `onLinkAccount`, explicitly call `internalAdapter.deleteSessions(anonymousUser.user.id)` before allowing the new session to be issued. ### Impact - **Stale session validity**: a deleted user's existing session cookie continues to authenticate against `getSessionFromCtx` until the session TTL elapses (default 7 days). Within that window, the deleted user retains their pre-existing read and write surface. - **SCIM-driven deprovisioning gap**: organizations using SCIM to revoke offboarded employees' access do not, in fact, revoke active sessions. The deleted account remains usable for up to 7 days after deprovisioning. ### Credit Reported by @iruizsalinas. ### Resources - [CWE-613: Insufficient Session Expiration](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/613.html) - [CWE-672: Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/672.html) - [CWE-459: Incomplete Cleanup](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/459.html)
- Source published
- 7 Jul 2026 20:56:45 UTC
- Source modified
- 10 Sep 2026 03:50:51 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
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This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
Publisher rating · LOW