n8n: Unauthenticated Endpoint Allows Cancellation of Any User's Active Test Webhook
Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.
osv · GHSA-33q9-f52j-gc75
Published## Impact The `DELETE /${restEndpoint}/test-webhook/:id` route is registered before the authentication middleware is applied, allowing any unauthenticated network caller who knows a workflow ID to cancel that workflow's active test webhook registration. The impact is limited to disrupting in-progress test sessions. Production webhooks, persistent workflow state, and stored data are not affected. ## Patches Users should upgrade to the patched version once available to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Restrict network access to the n8n instance to fully trusted users only. - Place the n8n instance behind a reverse proxy or firewall that requires authentication before reaching the REST API. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
- Source published
- 22 Jul 2026 22:36:10 UTC
- Source modified
- 22 Jul 2026 22:56:43 UTC
- Observed here
- 24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC
- Source terms
- GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0
Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON
This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.
CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Publisher rating · MODERATE