n8n: Git Node Clone and Push Operations Bypass File Sandbox

## Impact An authenticated user with permission to create or modify workflows could supply a local filesystem path as the source repository in the Git node's Clone operation, or as the target repository in the Push operation, bypassing the `N8N_RESTRICT_FILE_ACCESS_TO` file sandbox. This allowed the contents of any local git repository accessible to the n8n process to be cloned into an allowed path and read, circumventing the access restrictions that correctly blocked direct file reads to the same paths. ## Patches The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.48, 2.21.8, and 2.22.4. Users should upgrade to one of these versions or later to remediate the vulnerability. ## Workarounds If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations: - Limit workflow creation and editing permissions to fully trusted users only. - Disable the Git node by adding `n8n-nodes-base.git` to the `NODES_EXCLUDE` environment variable. These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.

Source published

16 Jun 2026 17:37:54 UTC

Source modified

20 Jul 2026 14:00:27 UTC

Observed here

24 Oct 2026 13:17:17 UTC

Source terms

GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N

CVSS_V4 · CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE