Public mode

No access to your tenant or devices. Every item links to its source. What this means

Some sources, documents or advisories need attention: 275/275 feeds/APIs · 469/469 docs · 8/9 advisories · checked 15:49 UTC Customize Public modeDiscuss ChangeIntel on Discord

HTTP Request Smuggling in hyper

Exact source revision recorded 24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC. It does not establish the source's current position. Latest evidence.

osv · GHSA-6hfq-h8hq-87mf

Published

### Summary hyper's HTTP server code had a flaw that incorrectly understands some requests with multiple transfer-encoding headers to have a chunked payload, when it should have been rejected as illegal. This combined with an upstream HTTP proxy that understands the request payload boundary differently can result in "request smuggling" or "desync attacks". ### Vulnerability The flaw was introduced in https://github.com/hyperium/hyper/commit/26417fc24a7d05df538e0f39239b373c5c3d61f6, released in v0.12.0. Consider this example request: ``` POST /yolo HTTP/1.1 Transfer-Encoding: chunked Transfer-Encoding: cow ``` This request *should* be rejected, according to RFC 7230, since it has a `Transfer-Encoding` header, but after folding, it does not end in `chunked`. hyper would notice the `chunked` in the first line, and then check the second line, and thanks to a missing boolean assignment, *not* set the error condition. hyper would treat the payload as being `chunked`. By differing from the spec, it is possible to send requests like these to endpoints that have different HTTP implementations, with different interpretations of the payload semantics, and cause "desync attacks". There are several parts of the spec that must also be checked, and hyper correctly handles all of those. Additionally, hyper's *client* does not allow sending requests with improper headers, so the misunderstanding cannot be propagated further. Read more about desync attacks: https://portswigger.net/research/http-desync-attacks-request-smuggling-reborn ### Impact To determine if vulnerable, all these things must be true: - **Using hyper as an HTTP *server*.** The client is not affected. - **Using HTTP/1.1.** HTTP/2 does not use `transfer-encoding`. - **Using a vulnerable HTTP proxy upstream to hyper.** If an upstream proxy correctly rejects the illegal transfer-encoding headers, the desync attack cannot succeed. If there is *no* proxy upstream of hyper, hyper cannot *start* the desync attack, as the client will repair the headers before forwarding. ### Patches We have released and backported the following patch versions: - v0.14.3 - v0.13.10 ### Workarounds Besides upgrading hyper, you can take the following options: - Reject requests that contain a `transfer-encoding` header. - Ensure any upstream proxy handles `transfer-encoding` correctly. ### Credits This issue was initially reported by ZeddYu Lu From Qi An Xin Technology Research Institute.

Source published
25 Aug 2021 20:56:18 UTC
Source modified
8 Jul 2026 06:28:31 UTC
Observed here
24 Oct 2026 13:19:54 UTC
Source terms
GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0

Original source record · Cite this exact observation · Complete original publisher JSON

This view projects the publisher's source fields for reading; the original JSON retains additional fields and CVE enrichment containers. Attribution: osv · GitHub Advisory Database · CC-BY-4.0. Source text is retained; field grouping and change labels are provided by ChangeIntel.

CVSS_V3 · CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

Publisher rating · MODERATE

ChangeIntel

An IT change radar: releases, security, known issues, retirements, documentation changes, and service status from public sources. Every item links to supporting evidence; dates and statuses can change after they are read.

Sources read 10 Nov 15:49 UTC · 275 of 275 readable · 274 fully read · documentation 469/469 current